

Opinions of Officers of the Chicago Police Department on the Upcoming Consent Decree:

A Report to the State of Illinois
Office of the Attorney General

July 2018



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Abbreviations

BWC	Body-worn Camera
CIT	Crisis Intervention Team
COPA	Civilian Office of Police Accountability
CPD	Chicago Police Department
DOJ	United States Department of Justice
FOP	Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge #7
FTO	Field Training Officer
ISR	Investigatory Stop Report
MDT	Mobile Data Terminal
NGT	Nominal Group Technique
PF	Police Foundation
PPO	Probationary Police Officer

Executive Summary

Purpose of Project

In August 2017, Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan filed a lawsuit against the City of Chicago, based on a year-long civil rights investigation conducted by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), into the practices of the Chicago Police Department (CPD). The DOJ investigation and public report detailed the following key areas of reform necessary for CPD:

- Improve CPD’s **accountability** system to identify police misconduct and hold officers accountable for their actions.
- Make **community policing** a core philosophy that is infused throughout the department’s policing strategies and tactics by ensuring that supervision, training, promotions and accountability systems incentivize and support officers who engage in community policing.
- Improve officer **supervision** in the field by creating policies that hold supervisors accountable for guiding officer behavior and reporting misconduct.
- Improve the quality and quantity of **officer training**, particularly pre-service Academy training, the Field Training Officer (FTO) program, and in-service training.
- Improve **officer assistance and support** by creating an overarching operational plan that includes robust counseling programs, comprehensive training, functioning equipment, and other tools to ensure officers are successful and healthy—physically, mentally and emotionally—and overcome officers’ concerns that using officer wellness services will negatively impact their career.
- Improve **data management** systems and quality of data used by the Independent Police Review Authority (IPRA) or Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA) so misconduct investigations can be tracked and analyzed.
- Increase **transparency** by publicly reporting use of force and misconduct complaints and settlements of officer misconduct lawsuits.
- Update **use of force** policies and improve officer training, reporting, and accountability systems when force is used.¹

The Mayor of Chicago and the Superintendent of CPD committed to working with Attorney General Madigan to negotiate a consent decree.² As part of the development and negotiation

¹ United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division and United States Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Illinois. *Investigation of the Chicago Police Department*. January 13, 2017. Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice. <https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download> (accessed April 23, 2018).

² “A consent decree is a court order that establishes an enforceable plan for sustainable reform. Typically, consent decrees are detailed documents that include specific requirements and deadlines for actions.” Illinois Attorney General’s Office. Chicago Police Consent Decree. 2018. <https://www.chicagopoliceconsentdecree.org> (accessed April 11, 2018).

of the consent decree, the Illinois Attorney General's Office gathered input from the community and CPD officers into key topics and areas of focus and potential solutions that could be mandated by the consent decree to reach sustainable reform for constitutional policing in Chicago.

Methodology³

The Illinois Attorney General's Office solicited the Police Foundation (PF) to facilitate a series of focus groups of sworn CPD officers. PF facilitated a total of 13 focus groups that included 11 focus groups of randomly selected CPD officers and two with members of affinity groups. All told, PF held focus groups with a total of 170 CPD officers. The purpose of the focus groups was to collect qualitative information from CPD officers on their perceptions of the department's challenges and areas of change needed under the consent decree.

CPD focus group participants were selected through a randomization process, and they were asked by their supervisors to report to the location of the focus groups. However, once they arrived, officers were given the option of participating in the discussion or not by the group facilitator and through an Informed Consent form provided to each officer upon arrival.⁴ No sign-ins were conducted, and PF team members did not know the names of the officers in the groups. All input was given with the assurance that while input was documented verbatim and would be included in this report, no names or other attribution would be shared. Affinity group officers self-selected and did not participate in the other CPD focus groups.

CPD focus groups were facilitated by PF Executive Fellows, Police Chief (ret.) Darrel Stephens, and Police Chief (ret.) Daniel Isom II, Ph.D.⁵ Chief Stephens is an accomplished police executive with 48 years of experience, serving in various ranks and ultimately as Chief of Police for the Charlotte-Mecklenburg (NC) Police Department. Recently, he also served as a Technical Advisor to the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing and as Executive Director of the Major Cities Chiefs Association. Chief Daniel Isom II is a Professor of Policing and the Community at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. He is also the retired Chief of Police for the Metropolitan Police Department-City of St. Louis.

During the focus groups, Nominal Group Technique (NGT) was used to gain input from the officers. "NGT gathers information by asking individuals to respond to questions posed by a moderator, and then asking participants to prioritize the ideas or suggestions of all group

³ A full detailed description of the methodology can be found in Appendix A of this report.

⁴ A full copy of the Informed Consent form can be found in Appendix B of this report.

⁵ Detailed biographies of Chiefs Isom and Stephens can be found in Appendix C of this report.

members.”⁶ Two specific questions were asked, and all of the officers’ answers were documented by PF staff on flipcharts and electronically.

The two questions posed during the focus groups and the affinity group meetings were:

- Question One. *“What are the biggest challenges you face in doing your job as a Chicago police officer safely and effectively?”*
- Question Two. *“What can the consent decree do to address these challenges, support officer safety, and enhance service to the community?”*

Finally, in an attempt to gain input from CPD officers who either did not feel comfortable talking in front of the group or who were not randomly selected to participate in the focus groups but wanted to provide input, PF also set up a password-protected open comment box on their website via SurveyMonkey. The website address and password to access the comment box was posted on the CPD intranet, provided to CPD officers via email and during roll calls, and focus group attendees were also encouraged to inform their colleagues about the comment box. The comment box was open for 17 days and received 24 responses.

Findings

Question One asked, *“What are the biggest challenges you face in doing your job as a Chicago police officer safely and effectively?”* A total of 295 specific items were noted by the participants and documented by PF staff.⁷ Many of the same items were identified across focus groups. To better organize the items and account for the overlaps, the specific issues were coded into 15 broader topics, with the following key topics receiving the most overall votes.

- Lack of Support
- Accountability
- Training
- Policies
- Staffing Shortages
- Equipment & Technology
- Lack of Proactive Policing
- Department Culture
- Hiring
- Expanded Role of Police

Question Two asked *“What can the consent decree do to address these challenges, support officer safety, and enhance service to the community?”* A total of 134 specific items were noted by the participants and documented by PF staff.⁸ Like question one, many of the items that were identified during the discussions were similar across the focus groups. To better organize the specific items and account for the overlaps, they were coded into 13 broader topics, with the following key topics receiving the most overall votes.

- Increased Support
- Increased, Enhanced & Mandated Training

⁶ “Gaining Consensus Among Stakeholders Through the Nominal Group Technique.” Evaluation Briefs. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. No. 7: November 2006. <https://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/evaluation/pdf/brief7.pdf> (accessed June 26, 2018).

⁷ A full list of responses can be found in Appendix D of this report.

⁸ A full list of responses can be found in Appendix E of this report.

- Accountability
- Staffing
- Promotional Process
- Transparency & Improvements
- Enhanced Policies
- New & Maintained Equipment, Technology & Facilities
- Communication
- Performance Measures
- Hiring

Additionally, PF solicited feedback from CPD officers regarding the items they felt should be addressed in the consent decree using an open comment box on PF's website. Twenty-four CPD officers provided comments, which mirrored the input gathered during the focus groups.⁹ To better organize the multiple items mentioned in many of the responses, the 24 responses were analyzed and coded into 17 broader topics with the following three topics being mentioned in more than two comments:

- Merit-Based Promotional Process
- Political Involvement/Lack of Political Support
- DOJ Investigation Report


⁹ A full list of responses can be found in Appendix F of this report.

Analysis of Findings

Question 1: What are the biggest challenges you face in doing your job as a Chicago police officer safely and effectively?—Issues Organized by Topic

Figure 1 identifies the most frequently discussed topics across all 13 of the focus groups and affinity group meetings. Topics pertaining to *equipment*, *lack of support* and *training* were discussed in every focus group. Other frequently discussed topics included *accountability*, *policy*, *expanded role of police*, and *staffing shortages*.

Figure 1: Topics Raised in Response to Question 1




When participants were asked to vote on the biggest challenges they face in doing their job as a Chicago police officer safely and effectively, *lack of support* received the highest number of votes (n=216, 33% of all votes cast). *Lack of support* included support from the criminal justice system, the community, the Chicago Police Department, support from elected officials, and the media. These results are displayed in Figure 2 and Figure 3.

Figure 2: Total Votes on Topics Raised in Response to Question 1

Topic	Total votes
Lack of Support	216
Accountability	119
Training	104
Policies	37
Staffing Shortages	37
Equipment & Technology	33
Department Culture	26
Lack of Proactive Policing	20
Hiring	13
Expanded Role of Police	12
Communications	9
Promotions	9
Performance Measures	7
Officer Safety and Wellness	5
Miscellaneous	1


Figure 3: Vote Percentages on Topics Raised in Response to Question 1 (n=648)



Question 2: What can the consent decree do to address these challenges, support officer safety, and enhance service to the community?—Issues Organized by Topic

Figure 4 identifies the topics discussed during the 13 focus groups. Ways that the consent decree could *increase support* were discussed in 11 of the 13 focus groups, while *increased, enhanced and mandated training* was discussed in nine focus groups. Topics including those pertaining to how the consent decree could address *accountability; new and maintained equipment, technology and facilities; and staffing* were raised in eight focus groups.

Figure 4: Topics Raised in Response to Question 2




The participants in one of the focus groups only raised one topic that they would like to see addressed in the consent decree and, therefore, did not vote. When the participants in the remaining 12 focus groups were asked to identify topics that the consent decree could deal with in order to address challenges, support officer safety, and enhance service to the community, *lack of support* received the highest number of votes (n=101, 21% of all votes cast). *Training, accountability, staffing, and promotions* all ranked in the top five in terms of the number of votes they received. These results are displayed in Figure 5 and Figure 6.

Figure 5: Total Votes on Topics Raised in Response to Question 2

Topic	# votes
Increased Support	101
Increased, Enhanced & Mandated Training	76
Accountability	75
Promotional Process Transparency & Improvements	59
Staffing	54
Enhanced Policies	41
New & Maintained Equipment, Technology & Facilities	32
Communication	17
Performance Measures	10
Hiring	8
Scope of Work	5
Officer Safety and Wellness	7
Miscellaneous	0

Figure 6: Vote Percentages on Topics Raised in Response to Question 2 (n=485)



Overarching Observations

While this report captures, in most cases verbatim, comments and input provided by Chicago police officers during focus groups, the PF team also believes it is important to note observations perhaps not captured in the description of participants' comments, but clearly and decisively observed by the team.

1. During focus group discussions, Chicago police officers displayed genuine care for the City of Chicago and for the safety of its people.

Of immediate note by the PF team was that the CPD officers expressed views that displayed genuine interest in both the well-being of Chicago and CPD. They spoke of wanting to protect the city and keep it safe from crime, but that they lack the resources to do so. Some officers spoke of their technology and equipment not functioning, sometimes putting them at risk while trying to do their jobs. Supervisors and officers consistently discussed the lack of support they face and the frustration that causes, but also acknowledged their commitment to their jobs, the city, and keeping communities safe. Officers of the Chicago Police Department seemed to want the best for the City of Chicago and for its people despite the difficulties they perceive in doing their job.

2. Participants were engaged in the focus groups, showing a good faith effort to improve the department and increase safety in the city.

The team also noted that officers' willingness to actively participate in the focus group discussion and process signaled a desire to contribute to the overall health and safety of the department, the city, and the community. Participants contributed to discussions, asked thoughtful questions, and engaged in meaningful dialogue with facilitators and each other, notwithstanding efforts by the local Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) to deter participation in focus groups. Participants were engaged in the discussion despite the fact that they were free to decline to participate; their obvious deep frustration with the current state of crime and policing in Chicago; and, their disagreement with the need for a consent decree in the first place. Even within CPD's ranks, disagreement exists about how to improve policing in the city, but they clearly desired to be part of the process and to have their voice heard in hopes that it will produce change for a better future in policing in Chicago.

3. Many participants showed physical signs of stresses caused by the job, including exceptionally low morale.

Another team observation was that, without exception, participants in each focus group showed a sense of frustration, hopelessness, and neglect regarding their experiences as police officers in Chicago. The PF team, including retired Chiefs Isom and Stephens—who have worked with police departments around the country—was surprised by the level of frustration and

anger with the current policing situation in Chicago exhibited by CPD supervisors and officers who participated in the focus groups. The PF team also observed that participants showed little hope that real, sustainable change for the better is possible. They seemed to believe that changes were necessary at so many levels within the City that the complexity of the task was overwhelming. Worse, participants' body language and posture as they described these conditions was that of stress, fatigue, and sometimes resignation. Participants' perceived a lack of support for officer safety and wellness, in large part by CPD, further compounded the stresses of the job, and PF team members observed physical signs of the toll the job has taken on some CPD participants.

4. Participants seemed to lack fact-based knowledge and understanding of important topics discussed, including the DOJ investigation of their department, the consent decree, and levels of accountability.

During focus groups, the PF team noted that many participants lacked a thorough understanding of key topics related to the consent decree and the department's position. For example, some participants had questions about the data and findings of the DOJ investigation and the lawsuit filed by the Illinois Attorney General's Office. Many participants also inquired about the consent decree content and process, and the impact of consent decrees on policing in other law enforcement agencies. They also seemed to lack an understanding as to why the City and CPD agreed to negotiate a consent decree. Additionally, when referring to CPD policy and practice, focus group participants often referenced stories conveyed by others, what they were told by the FOP, or what they read in the newspaper. This type of reliance could show a void in a well-communicated message from the department's administration, the City of Chicago, and/or the Illinois Attorney General's Office related to the consent decree process.

Discussion of Key Topics and Areas of Focus—Question #1

During the focus groups, two specific questions were asked, and participants' answers and perceptions were documented by PF staff on flipcharts and electronically. The first question asked was: ***What are the biggest challenges you face in doing your job as a Chicago police officer safely and effectively?*** A total of 295 specific items were noted by the participants and documented by PF staff.¹⁰ Many of the same items were identified across focus groups. To better organize the items and account for the overlaps, the specific items were coded into 15 broader topics, with the following ten topics receiving the most overall votes. The below list is in the order of priority as defined by the overall number of votes it received during focus groups.

1. Lack of Support (from the Department, Media, Community, Elected Officials, Criminal Justice System)

Universally, focus groups identified the lack of support from supervisors and command staff, elected officials, and the public as negatively impacting their ability to do their job safely and effectively.

Lack of Support Internally from Department Command and Supervisors. Some focus group participants indicated that the lack of internal support—from the CPD command staff all the way down to their direct supervisors—has complicated day-to-day work for police officers, contributed to a lack of proactive policing, and depleted officer morale. Focus group participants perceived that the CPD command staff is more concerned with satisfying City elected officials, the media, and the community than with defending department members. Particularly in difficult or complex situations, such as use of force, focus group participants recounted times where CPD administration officials were more apt to remain silent or make a statement suggesting that officers may have been at fault, than to support the officer(s) involved. This lack of support extended to the perception that the command staff was more likely to believe complainants than officers and that officers are “guilty until proven innocent.” Multiple participants stated that the department would rather settle lawsuits alleging impropriety than interview officers and witnesses that could prove the suit is frivolous. In addition to settling lawsuits quickly and favoring the community over CPD officers, focus group participants expressed the feeling that the command staff too frequently disciplines officers for not following the exact letter of policies and general orders, even when the outcome is correct. The perception is that the department leadership too frequently agrees with the findings and discipline recommended by the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA).¹¹

¹⁰ A full list of responses can be found in Appendix D of this report.

¹¹ Under the current disciplinary process, if the Superintendent and COPA agree on the discipline recommended, the Superintendent imposes the recommended discipline. If the Superintendent disagrees with COPA, the Superintendent has the burden of overcoming COPA's recommendation. The dispute is heard by a single member

Focus group participants also described the lack of internal support coming from direct supervisors. They explained that some supervisors are uninterested in providing additional on-the-job instruction, mentoring, or providing solutions to difficult situations when they are called to a scene. Some participants suggested that this is directly related to the fear of repercussions from COPA, the department, and lawsuits resulting from potentially making wrong tactical decisions, coupled with supervisors not wanting to be responsible for making what could be perceived as the wrong supervisory decision. Other focus group participants suggested that their supervisors are more concerned with protecting their continued advancement opportunities by not getting involved in direct supervision. Participants suggested that the lack of support from CPD leadership has contributed to a lack of proactive policing by officers in Chicago.

Focus group participants also explained that supervisors feel pressured by the CompStat¹² process and the department's overall focus on numbers-based performance metrics. Participants shared that supervisors are more concerned with CompStat metrics than they are with personnel management and community policing. They shared that pressure to produce CompStat metrics—or what the focus group participants called “quotas”—is then passed down from supervisors, who expect their officers to prioritize arrests and stops versus focusing on community policing and effectively dealing with more challenging calls. Some participants noted that supervisors lack the personnel management skills and compassion necessary to provide the professional support that officers require. One participant noted that their supervisor criticized or talked about officers behind their backs instead of providing direction and instruction.

Additionally, some participants described the lack of internal communication as indicative of the lack of support coming from their supervisors and the command staff. These participants stated that they are made aware of significant announcements or policy changes from the media, not their supervisors or command staff. Participants also indicated that dissemination of important information by the administration is generally rushed and uncoordinated. They noted that the lack of a consistent internal communication strategy makes it difficult to know what the goals and objectives of CPD are and how they are expected to help achieve those goals through their daily actions on the streets.

of the Chicago Police Board. If the reviewing Police Board member finds that the Superintendent has met his or her burden, the Superintendent's discipline is imposed. If the reviewing Police Board member finds that the Superintendent has not met his or her burden, COPA's recommendation is imposed. Civilian Office of Police Accountability, Investigative Process, <http://www.chicagocopa.org/investigations/investigative-process/> (last visited June 26, 2018).

¹² Computer comparison statistics (CompStat) is a management system that was created by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) to “gather and disseminate information on the NYPD's crime problems and to track efforts to deal with them.” David Weisburd, Stephen D. Mastrofski, Rosann Greenspan, and James J. Willis. *The Growth of Compstat in American Policing*. April 2004. Police Foundation. <https://www.policefoundation.org/publication/the-growth-of-compstat-in-american-policing/> (last visited July 12, 2018).

Lack of Support from the Media. Biased and negative portrayals by the media and on social media were mentioned frequently by the focus group participants regardless of rank. They indicated that the media will frequently not fully report elements of a CPD incident, focusing on information to sell the story rather than providing all of the factual information about the incident. Focus group participants' perception was that the media has been slanted against the police for some time and that it is influencing public perception, which makes their daily interactions with the community more volatile. Some officers expanded upon this, suggesting that after each critical incident the media is quick to condemn the officer and use the case as additional evidence that the department is corrupt. In addition, participants suggested that the media has significantly contributed to sensationalizing and demonizing the police, and they believe that the community suspects every officer of being crooked or of racially profiling. Negative portrayals of the police by the media were also identified as having an impact on the department's ability to recruit. Participants explained that having every action they take examined under a microscope by the media dissuades many from wanting to be a police officer.

Lack of Support from the Community. Many of the focus group participants indicated that the ability to conduct their job safely and effectively was impeded by a decline in police-community relations in recent years, and a general lack of community support. This was attributed in large part to negative portrayals of policing in general—and of CPD specifically—in the media and on social media, as well as through reporting misperceptions and misrepresentations of specific incidents. Officers also noted a societal lack of respect for authority as influencing negative police-community relations. Many officers expressed concerns that citizens disrespect police officers and are less likely to comply with officer orders today compared to in the past. Additionally, focus group participants described a lack of public understanding of the difficulties of policing.

Lack of Support from Elected Officials. Lack of support from elected officials was also discussed in almost all of the focus groups and was identified as an item that participants felt prevented them from doing their jobs safely and effectively. Participants noted that elected officials say what is necessary to be reelected, and that while CPD and elected officials should be united in reducing crime and improving community safety, the current political environment favors a "war on police." Focus group participants specifically mentioned increased influence by civilians and community organizations in the development of policies, civilian oversight into police accountability and police investigations, and the politicization of police priorities and practices as impediments. A handful expressed their frustration regarding the lack of political support by noting the hypocrisy surrounding the fact that multiple elected officials in Chicago have been imprisoned or indicted for crimes, but the police department is facing a consent decree. Overall, participants noted that until elected officials are no longer allowed to have significant influence in departmental decisions, nothing will be able to change.

Lack of Support from the Criminal Justice System. Focus group participants also expressed frustration with a perceived lack of support from the Cook County State's Attorney's Office and the judicial system. Participants explained that they could only affect a felony arrest on an

individual with a known criminal history, because, in their view, the State's Attorney's Office reduces felony charges to misdemeanors or is unwilling to prosecute. During the focus groups, participants suggested that this results in individuals returning to the street causing similar problems only days later, in some cases; responding to a call involving the same individual frustrates officers. They also suggested that mandating harsher penalties and truth-in-sentencing requirements would prevent judges from being lenient on repeat offenders, which also further complicates their jobs.

2. Accountability

Many focus group participants considered the fear of negative repercussions and an over-abundance of accountability measures put in place for police as one of the largest challenges to doing their job safely and effectively. A handful of participants mentioned that they had too much to potentially lose—their job, pension, house, and family—to risk what they perceive to be a potentially unfair or incorrect COPA ruling and the repercussions associated with such a ruling. One participant suggested that historically the understanding has been that, “if your heart was in the right place when you took action, even if you made a mistake, you would be okay.” However, this line of thinking has been replaced by the fear that even if officers do everything appropriately, a complainant can make an unfounded accusation and the officer will be subjected to investigations and penalties. Other participants agreed and added that they feel inhibited from taking action in some cases because they fear they will be subjected to removal of vacation days, suspensions without pay, termination, or lawsuits. They also noted that the fear of repercussions weighs so heavily that some of their colleagues second guess every decision they make while on the street. Participants noted this as an enormous officer safety issue, particularly in critical situations where split-second decisions have significant impacts and some officers have become hesitant to take any action, including using necessary force.

In addition to the general fear of repercussions, many participants specifically identified COPA as the office responsible for substantially contributing to the officers' fear of repercussions. Almost all of the focus groups participants that mentioned COPA stated they believed that because all of its employees are civilians, they are not properly trained in policing or on CPD policies, procedures, or general orders, and they are thus not well-informed about the challenges that the police face on a daily basis. Participants believed that COPA employees undergo two weeks of training, and they believe that this is an inadequate length of time given the authority they possess. Participants also expressed that they believe COPA is extremely biased against the police department and consistently renders findings (or rulings) against police officers. Some participants perceived that COPA has leveraged its authority to find officers at fault in scenarios where CPD's Bureau of Internal Affairs found that their actions were justified; to consistently and frequently recommend at least a suspension without pay or loss of vacation days; and to unfairly reopen cases that were previously adjudicated (years ago in some cases) to appease the community and elected officials.

Focus group participants also mentioned the number of devices that record them—and that they are required to use—as duplicative and unnecessary accountability measures. Participants noted that in addition to the dashboard camera in their car, they are required to wear a body-worn camera (BWC) that captures audio and video, a separate microphone to capture audio, and anything they say over the radio is also recorded. In addition to having all of these devices, participants added that if they forget to turn on the radio, the cameras, or the microphone in accordance with department policies, they are likely to be questioned for the validity of the stop they conducted.

Participants also perceived the need to swipe in at the beginning of their shifts and out at the end of their shifts as an unnecessary additional accountability measure enacted by the City. As discussed during the focus group, despite the fact that all other City departments use swiping—and that the concept was initiated by the Mayor—participants questioned the efficiency of swiping in and out and believed that this would cause unnecessary delays. Participants also questioned the effectiveness of the system and its need. While it was not mentioned as frequently as COPA and the fear of lawsuits, it was specifically mentioned as another accountability measure created by the City to appease the community and elected officials.

3. Training

The focus groups almost universally identified various aspects of department training as an important topic and one in need of improvement. Overall, training was summarized as too infrequent, reactionary, outdated, inapplicable, and merely intended to protect the CPD administration and the City from lawsuits.

Police Academy. Academy training was described as overcrowded, unorganized, and ineffective in preparing recruits to become probationary police officers (PPOs). Some recent academy graduates specified that some instructors were consistently late or did not show up at all and were unprepared and/or inexperienced as instructors. Other participants described some instructors as disconnected from what was actually occurring on the street because they had not worked the street in many years, and that they were unable to translate the curricula into practical instruction. Some officers suggested that academy training could be improved by reducing the amount of lecture and video training and increasing the use of scenario-based training. One officer expressed genuine concerns that academy trainers were “out of touch” with the circumstances that occur when working the street. This officer also suggested that this influences the culture of the department and reinforces systemic issues within CPD.

Field Training Officer (FTO) Program. Once PPOs graduate from the academy, they are assigned an FTO to receive additional experiential training in Chicago neighborhoods. However, many of the focus group participants—including FTOs—noted that the program has shortcomings, including too many PPOs per FTO, lack of incentives to encourage quality officers to become FTOs, and lack of training for FTOs. Some participants—who were FTOs—recounted having more than one PPO at a given time, which led to an inability to provide specialized training to

PPOs who were at different levels of comprehension of department policy and procedure. Other FTOs indicated that because they had to use cars without cages to accommodate the PPOs, they could not provide training or experience on affecting an arrest. Lack of meaningful incentives and having to change partners were also mentioned repeatedly as impediments to attracting more experienced officers to become FTOs. The incentives that were mentioned included a slight pay increase, the opportunity to bid out of their district, and the ability to choose their shift. More tenured participants—who were not FTOs—suggested that the comfort of a steady partner, instead of the uncertainty of PPOs, generally deterred them and their colleagues from becoming FTOs. More-tenured focus group participants also expressed that being an FTO was not worth the potential ramifications and repercussions if one of their PPOs makes a mistake. Almost universally, the focus groups believed that the qualifications for being an FTO needed to be adjusted, as the minimum tenure for an FTO (three years) does not allow officers enough time on the job to obtain the necessary experience to properly train and prepare PPOs to be full-time officers.

In-service Training. Focus group participants also highlighted deficiencies in the in-service training. Of large issue to some of the officers was that no minimum standards exist for annual in-service training. Focus group participants explained that some important in-service training opportunities are optional, when they should be required, such as crisis intervention team (CIT) training. Because CIT training is optional—often offered only during certain shifts (days) and not regularly scheduled—some focus group participants expressed that they would like to be trained in CIT but have not had the opportunity to attend training. Without this training, focus group participants suggested that they often wait for a CIT-trained officer to arrive on scene, rather than handle the situation in a way that may run counter to CIT protocols learned during trainings. Participants reported that most in-service training is only provided during the day shift, and that this means that supervisors not working days have to adjust schedules for their officers to be able to attend trainings. Participants shared that while convenient, much of the CPD in-service training is conducted through videos and online instruction, to the exclusion of situational, scenario-based and hands-on training where the principles being taught must be applied. Focus group participants consistently recommended a combination of the two types of training to provide more skills to more officers.

Focus groups participants described having to watch a general video or click through a couple of high-level documents and then electronically sign a document indicating that they had completed the training. They suggested that for general orders and new legislation—where participants explained that understanding legal implications and practical implementation is imperative—this type of in-service training for complex guidance on policy and practice was perceived as inadequate and ineffective. In fact, focus group participants perceived the in-service training, and the process for administering the training provided, as a quick and easy way to protect the department from lawsuits—leaving officers vulnerable if a response is called into question—instead of prioritizing training based on the needs of the officers or the situations they are experiencing on patrol. Focus groups frequently referred to this type of training as “check the box” training. Additionally, some participants stated that because CPD

lacks enough equipment (such as Tasers, breathalyzers, and radar guns), some officers are not trained on use of that equipment.

Firearms Qualification. Participants also specifically identified the lack of firearms training and qualification as a safety risk for both officers and the community. Focus group participants noted that the department used to provide 100 rounds of ammunition annually to each officer so that they could practice and train with their firearms whenever the officer was able. These participants explained that this is no longer the case and that officers are currently only required to qualify annually.

4. Policies

A number of focus group participants described unclear, inconsistent, and rushed policies as impairing their ability to do their job safely and effectively. Additionally, some noted that the involvement of community members and organizations in creating department policies has had a perceived impact on what officers can reasonably do and has turned the department from being proactive to reactive.

Focus group participants explained that the development and dissemination of policies is sometimes rushed, but that officers are expected to know all new policies and become fluent in each immediately upon release to the rank and file. One participant explained that there is no opportunity to ask questions about possible interpretations and application of policies and that their personal interest in law and policy was the only thing that helped them understand. Another explained that policies are not always black and white, but officers are expected to follow them verbatim or face consequences. One participant explained that depending on how you read and interpret the use of force policy, for example, you may be forced to use your gun instead of a Taser in certain situations and then you are left to be second guessed by the media; participants saw this as a no-win situation. Other participants mentioned that not everyone has access to Tasers—because they are assigned to cars, not individuals—and therefore not all officers have been trained on them, yet, everyone is still expected to understand and abide by the policies related to them.

Some focus group participants also commented that the involvement of the community and community organizations has significantly impacted their policing efforts, especially after critical incidents. Participants perceived that CPD leadership has changed policies to appease elected officials and the community, but these changes handicap officers because the policies contradict training, lack clear instruction and training on their application, sacrifice officer safety, and are inconsistent with other department goals. Many of the focus groups honed-in on the Investigatory Stop Report (ISR) process and policy as one that has had the largest impact on their ability to be proactive in enforcement. While officers have been required to fill out contact cards as part of community contacts based on reasonable suspicion for some time, newer ISRs—according to participants—are lengthier. Participants explained that the new process requires CPD officers to complete an ISR when they conduct any stop or contact based

on reasonable suspicion, collect much more in-depth information, and explain the rationale for the stop or contact. Officers' perception is that the intent of the ISRs is for CPD to collect data on potential racial bias in stops and contacts. However, some officers believe that the ACLU has access to all of the ISRs and, in some cases, follow up with community members to encourage them to file complaints against officers.

The vehicular pursuit policy was also specifically identified by focus group participants as impacting their ability to do their job effectively and enforce Illinois laws. Multiple participants noted that they believe the policy is so restrictive that criminals can flee, and officers would not be able to pursue them, putting the community at further risk.

5. Staffing Shortages

Focus group participants discussed the challenges associated with safely and effectively performing their duties while being significantly understaffed. Some suggested that the recent cycle seems to be that the department hires approximately 1,000 officers, then loses a couple hundred to attrition, and has not come close to the budgeted 13,500 sworn officers. Some also expressed feeling as if the department is “treading water” with sworn officers, by not having the full number of sworn staff to properly provide police services in the City of Chicago. Others suggested that the department intentionally double counts officers who are patrol officers, and who also have special duty assignments to inflate the number of sworn officers.

Others discussed staffing shortages that result in ineffective allocation of officers at district stations. Some participants indicated that there are districts with an unnecessarily high number of officers, while other districts are forced to frequently have one-officer cars instead of the traditional two-person patrols because they do not have enough officers to partner. One participant explained that districts that have decreasing crime are often penalized because those district officers are then shifted to other districts that have crime problems—at the expense of having the police presence that they believe led to the crime drop in the first place. Participants in focus groups also explained that the lack of officers has ancillary impacts. Some explained that because supervisors barely have enough officers to put on the streets, officers cannot be freed up to receive the department training they need. Others described not being able to take vacation or having their vacation days canceled because the department was short-staffed. Still others mentioned that supervisors are not able to allow partners to patrol together consistently, which participants identified as a safety issue because of the inability to develop rapport and comfort in knowing where your partner is and what they are thinking under different circumstances. Participants conveyed that they believe that this also fuels officers' experience of lack of support and overall stress.

6. Equipment and Technology

Multiple focus groups mentioned that the equipment and technology provided by the department was unreliable and impeded their ability to effectively carry out their

responsibilities. Participants mentioned that this lack of reliable equipment and technology negatively impacts their ability to train with certain pieces of equipment (primarily Tasers and firearms), decreases officer safety and wellness, and contributes to general inefficiencies in day-to-day processes. It also contributes to officers' perception of a lack of support from CPD.

Some participants believed that equipment was duplicative in some cases and deficient in others. They described having a BWC with a microphone, a separate portable microphone that they are required to wear, and an in-car dashboard camera. Others mentioned having too much equipment on their utility belt and vest. This was contrasted with participants who believed that the department does not have enough basic supplies; vehicles; and working computers, printers, and other technology. In addition to lacking simple office supplies, like paper to print reports and other documents in the district sub-stations, they expanded that CPD lacked more contemporary equipment—like automated license plate readers and driver's license scanners in patrol vehicles—to do things like conduct speed limit enforcement.

Multiple participants indicated that their mobile data terminal (MDT) and radios frequently do not work or easily lose signal because their internet service is not consistent throughout the police districts and patrol areas. One participant indicated that because there is not a function on MDTs to save reports before they are complete, if the signal cuts out, the officer has to restart from the beginning, which is frustrating because it causes unnecessary work for those on patrol. Additionally, these dead zones create an officer safety risk because when the MDT is not connected, the GPS does not function and important information about calls is not readily available.

In addition to the MDTs, focus group participants noted that the computers in the district stations are equally unreliable. Multiple participants recounted difficulties in identifying enough functioning computers to complete quality reports efficiently. They recounted situations where only one computer in a district station was working so they were required to wait to type up reports from their shift. Other participants noted that because finding computers next to each other was difficult, partners could not sit next to each other and work on reports about the same incident, which impacted the quality of their reports. As for radios, participants conveyed that in certain locations that they patrol, their radios are ineffective.

Another participant mentioned that the department's Tasers frequently do not work, fail during use, or do not produce the intended impact. The participant suggested that when people wear multiple layers of clothing or heavier clothing during cold weather, the darts cannot make contact with the individual, which limits their effectiveness and reliability in a city like Chicago where the weather is frequently cold. They noted that needing to potentially rely on an unreliable piece of equipment posed officer and community safety implications.

Focus group participants also described ancillary problems related to the equipment, including cars not being designed to fit all equipment necessary for protection; poor positioning of the MDT docking stations; and the magnetic holders for the BWCs not being strong enough to stay

in place, particularly when wearing heavy winter coats or during foot pursuits. One participant explained that the implications for losing a BWC are so severe that they purchased their own click-in holder to avoid losing the equipment. Another participant noted that because the breathalyzers at the academy were broken during their Academy training, their entire recruit class is not certified in its use and cannot conduct driving-while-intoxicated stops.

The software systems and applications that run on the MDTs and station computers were also described as problematic. Participants mentioned that the patchwork system that requires them to access multiple applications to document various parts of an arrest is extremely inefficient and can lengthen the time required to document an arrest that can already take hours to process. Multiple midnight shift participants also indicated that if required updates to the system are necessary, it normally occurs during their shift, which can cause additional delays in their ability to complete administrative work. Others described having to manually enter driver's licenses because the department does not have the technology to be able to scan them. Finally, officers explained that if equipment necessary for accountability—such as one of the cameras or microphones—is broken or lost, it is fixed or replaced quickly. By contrast, they thought equipment necessary for officer safety or to effectively conduct their job takes considerably longer to replace and is not maintained as well.

7. Lack of Proactive Policing

Focus group participants mentioned that a reduction in proactive policing has been occurring amongst some CPD officers, which prevents others from doing their job safely and effectively. They noted that some colleagues were refraining from getting involved in some situations for fear of it escalating to needing to use force. These participants suggested that the reluctance to do anything beyond clearing calls stemmed from a lack of motivation to conduct proactive police work and the vulnerability associated with it if their supervisors did not support their decision-making as it relates to police tactics on scene. One participant suggested that the documentation for a traffic or pedestrian stop has become so in-depth, tedious, and time-consuming that they just do not affect stops anymore. Similarly, as mentioned above, some officers simply are not trained to conduct some proactive policing tactics, such as administering a breathalyzer test. Another explained his perception that taking any proactive action will likely be skewed by the media, community members, and community organizations, so it was just easier to not take the chance to engage in proactive policing. They noted that with all of the processes that an officer has to go through and the pieces of equipment that they are required to turn on, there is the potential to accidentally forget to do something small and then have the contact scrutinized, so it is safer to simply no longer take proactive policing action.

8. Department Culture

In addition to lack of support from CPD administration and supervisors, some focus group participants identified the overall department culture as one of the biggest challenges to doing their jobs safely and effectively. Some noted cultural challenges based on race, generational

divide, and gender. More-tenured focus group participants voiced their belief that younger officers do not understand or respect the chain-of-command, are too hesitant to use force when necessary, and do not fully understand the importance of face-to-face interaction (in an age of texting); this has started to create a new department culture within their age cohort. Additionally, these participants perceived that certain recruits and younger officers do not take the time to understand policies and practices, think they already know the best way to handle situations based on what they learned in the academy or from family members who were police officers, and do not want to admit that they may need help. Participants suggested that this mentality creates potential officer safety issues.

Meanwhile, less-tenured participants suggested that their more mature colleagues are resistant to change, do not understand technology and that their mentality that any community member that they attempt to talk to or who is the subject of a stop and question should automatically follow directions is outdated and ineffective. This has created a generational divide in the department that some suggested has had an impact on how the department polices.

Additionally, some participants perceived that minority and women officers do not receive the same level of respect—particularly from their subordinates—as their white, male colleagues. These participants explained that they experience a “double whammy,” and “get it from every angle,” which they defined as not receiving support from their supervisors as it is related to training and promotions while also not receiving the same level of respect and support from colleagues. The participants also conveyed being belittled in the community as problematic to doing their job.

9. Hiring

Focus group participants perceive that CPD has lowered its recruitment and hiring standards to dangerous levels to alleviate staffing shortages and has done so at the expense of officer safety and effectiveness. Participants explained that lowering the hiring standards begins with making the entrance exam significantly easier and inflating scores to be able to fill academy classes. By doing this, according to the groups, the department is able to push people through the academy. However, participants suggested that this does not bode well for the quality of PPOs that graduate. As a result, they suggested that recent recruit classes have included recruits who are unable to write reports when they graduate and who have expressed no desire to learn the job or conduct traditional police work. This sentiment was echoed by a handful of PPOs who participated in the focus groups and noted that they were generally unprepared to do more than write reports upon graduation from the Academy, and instead had to learn most of what they know from experiencing things themselves during field training. Some focus group participants went so far as to describe recent recruit classes as including people who were only interested in collecting a paycheck from the City. They noted that this has impacted officer safety and decreased the overall professionalism of the department.

10. Expanded Role of Police

Focus group participants indicated that CPD has become the agency that must solve the challenges that other city, county, and state agencies cannot or do not address. Many participants described having to serve as a mental health counselor, social worker, medic, parent or teacher, domestic violence victim advocate, and substance abuse counselor, as well as deliver police services all during their shift, making the job of a police officer infinitely more challenging. Focus group participants also explained that they do not receive the necessary level of training to address these situations as effectively as the appropriate counselor or social worker. Focus group participants explained that while the 40-hour CIT training—which they believe CPD has condensed into shorter Force Mitigation training—is beneficial, it does not fully prepare officers to be mental health counselors. Officers shared they feel pressured by the CompStat process and the department’s overall focus on numbers-based performance metrics to clear calls as quickly as they can, but are also trained in and expected to use de-escalation techniques to resolve potentially volatile situations involving persons with mental illnesses, which can take hours. This struggle leaves officers unsure of how to balance their expanded roles with their responsibility to clear calls-for-service. They suggested that the combination of increased tasks and expectations along with the lack of training or inadequate training further impacts their ability to provide professional police services. Focus group participants also indicated that because the training was offered, they are now expected to adhere to all the principles perfectly. They suggested that each time law enforcement expands its scope of work to include a new function—receiving a brief training and policy—it comes with increased pressure from the department and increased scrutiny from the public and the media if something goes wrong. They perceived that this positions the police department to take the blame for the inability of the government to adequately fund and respond with appropriate entities that are best prepared to offer social services.

Discussion of Key Topics and Areas of Focus—Question #2

The second question asked, “*What can the consent decree do to address these challenges, support officer safety, and enhance service to the community?*” A total of 134 specific items and perceptions were noted by the participants and documented by PF staff.¹³ Many of the same items were identified across focus groups. To better organize the items and account for the overlaps, the specific items were coded into 13 broader topics, with the following ten key topics receiving the most overall votes.

1. Increased Support (Community and Elected Officials)

Focus group participants overwhelmingly requested that the consent decree include measures that will help to increase support from elected officials and community members and will indicate to officers that support does exist.

Focus group participants recommended that the consent decree require the City to develop and execute a public education strategy for community members, which would provide opportunities for community members to learn more about policing and crime in Chicago from the perspective of CPD versus only getting information from the media and social media. In addition to community members not understanding the challenges facing the police, some officers expressed concerns that the police sometimes do not understand the citizens they are serving or the challenges facing the community. To address this, some officers recommended CPD develop training to promote cultural awareness and sensitivity to improve the relationship between the police and the community. One officer suggested that the training be geared toward the cultural nuances of the neighborhood in which the officer works.

Others suggested that requiring the City to allocate funds and resources to CPD to foster and improve relationships and build bridges with the community would result in enhanced police-community relations and increased support from elected officials for the department. Specific ideas mentioned to achieve this goal, and to promote awareness around challenges that officers face, included running the ten-week citizens police academy more frequently and publishing educational advertisements or public service announcements.

Participants suggested that the consent decree require the City to fully fund officer pensions as a demonstration of exemplifying increased support for the department. Participants indicated that the City keeping up with its financial obligation to support officers would send a message to the officers that they are important to the city. Participants also requested that the consent decree somehow require elected officials to refrain from inserting politics into the department’s policies and procedures, particularly during campaigns.

¹³ A full list of responses can be found in Appendix E of this report.

2. Increased, Enhanced, and Mandated Training

Many of the focus group participants indicated that increased opportunities for and availability of quality training is a necessary part of reform at CPD. They suggested improving academy training, field training, and in-service training. Additionally, focus group participants would like to see the consent decree mandate certain training for all officers and require a set amount of annual in-service training. Overall, the participants thought that CPD needs a strategic training plan to guide a more-comprehensive management, planning, and oversight structure for training.

Academy & Field Training. During focus group discussions, participants expressed the need to entirely overhaul the police academy training program, to include bringing in instructors with more subject matter expertise and recent field experience. They said the academy needs to better prepare graduates for their experiences as PPOs, and that the overall training at the academy should be more robust, including adding more scenario-based training. Likewise, participants pointed out the need to provide incentives to entice more tenured and more experienced officers to serve as FTOs.

In-service. According to participants, officers currently receive most of their in-service training in static formats such as watching videos or presentations or “clicking through a PowerPoint or policy.” Focus groups indicated that having more hands-on and situational training would help them better apply the techniques and principles learned to real-world scenarios. They also recommended that the consent decree include an increased requirement for regular in-service training, particularly one that provides updates on significant legal and department policy changes and provides insight into practical application of those changes to policing.

Focus group participants also recommended that certain trainings—particularly CIT training—be mandated, rather than voluntary, so that the officers on every shift are provided access to much-needed instruction during their regular shifts.

Firearms Qualification. Many participants also recommended that firearms qualifications occur more frequently than just once a year. Some suggested that qualifications should be at least twice per year, while others indicated that it should be quarterly.

3. Accountability

Focus group participants discussed their desire to see accountability measures implemented as part of a more fair and integrated process. They noted, in particular, civilian oversight and investigations to check CPD. They perceived that each critical incident is followed by a knee-jerk reaction to include more oversight, which has created a labyrinth of systems of accountability for officers that has become too difficult to keep up with. Some suggested that language be included in the consent decree to check the ability of civil rights organizations, and civilians in particular, to determine department policies and general orders. This stemmed from the

perception that civilian community members and civil rights organizations do not understand the nuances of police work, and—while their policy requirements may seem reasonable—often the practical implications of those policies are not considered by those without experience. Rather, the participants suggested that the consent decree require a more thoughtful, fair, and integrated process that balances the input of these individuals and organizations with the safety and practicality needs of law enforcement.

Participants also discussed the idea of requiring specific experience for COPA staff handling investigations. Focus group participants suggested that the consent decree mandate that COPA investigations include at least one person with police expertise. They believed this would help to significantly reduce the bias against CPD officers perceived by focus group participants. Inclusion of individuals with police expertise would also reduce the second guessing that participants described occurs when officers face potential investigations and sanctions despite following laws and department policies. Along similar lines, participants requested that the consent decree provide indemnification and limit punitive damages that officers could be subjected to as a result of lawsuits.

Some focus group participants also recommended that the consent decree should remove the additional accountability measure of swiping in and out of their shifts. Officers believed this to be an unnecessary addition imposed by the City and conveys an unfair lack of trust and support.

4. Staffing

Focus group participants recommended that the consent decree require the department to develop a realistic hiring plan that will result in the full staffing of qualified officers for the department. Some participants indicated that CPD is a male-dominated department and believed that a hiring or staffing plan should include sections clearly outlining processes for creating a more diverse department. Many also suggested specifically defining supervisor-to-officer ratios to ensure more appropriate oversight in the field. In addition, some of the focus group participants recommended that the consent decree include a staffing allocation study or workload analysis to address inequality in how districts are staffed.

5. Promotional Process Transparency and Improvements

Almost universally, focus group participants recommended addressing and reforming the existing merit-based promotional process and increasing transparency in the overall promotional process. There was a clear consensus that the promotional exams be administered more frequently than once every ten years. Focus group participants suggested that the consent decree clearly define and make consistent the steps and standards for promotions, require the department to schedule exams consistently and more regularly, and require third-party organizations or law enforcement agencies to administer the promotional exams to avoid favoritism.

6. Enhanced Policies

Focus group participants suggested that the consent decree address the lack of clarity and strength of some CPD policies. They suggested that some of the department's policies, particularly regarding the process and requirements surrounding ISRs, should be revised to consider the perspective of officer safety. Others explained that policies cannot always be implemented in their exact steps in real situations and recommended that the consent decree require department policies and general orders to include language to reduce repercussions if the intent of the policy is followed. Other participants suggested that the consent decree mandate that CPD policies, particularly the use of force policy, provide more clarity and better mirror state statutes. The focus group participants also requested that the consent decree mandate processes to allow for officer input into policy, procedure, and general order changes that affect practical implementation on the street. They suggested that the department's comprehensive strategic communications plan include a process to better keep officers up to date on policy changes and include a process that allows officer input into the development of policy.

7. New and Maintained Equipment, Technology, and Facilities

Focus group participants also requested that the consent decree mandate that CPD improve equipment, technology, and facilities. They suggested that equipment standards be implemented to require CPD to purchase and maintain equipment, including working computers in patrol vehicles and district stations, Tasers, and other basic supplies. They also suggested that the consent decree require the City to support CPD with new technology to increase effectiveness and bring the department into the 21st Century fight against crime. Focus groups requested that the academy and training facilities, as well as the deteriorating district stations, be repaired and improved to support the officers and improve morale.

8. Communication

Participants in the focus groups suggested that the consent decree mandate efforts to address internal and external communications. Some noted that the consent decree should require CPD to develop an internal strategic communication plan to disseminate important information, particularly about new policies and procedures. Additionally, participants suggested that the consent decree require the department to enhance its external communications strategy as well to better tell its own story and explain its actions to the public. They suggested that the external communications strategy include the department policy on how and in what form it releases information, particularly body-worn camera footage, and explain that it is designed to avoid influence of potential criminal prosecutions and cases, not to hide nefarious police acts.

9. Performance Measures

Focus group participants recommended that the consent decree require CPD to establish performance measures that eliminate the focus on numbers-based policing. These participants indicated that CompStat has become such a predominant influence throughout the department, that performance measures are almost entirely numbers-based, and are merely an attempt by CPD command staff to rename “quotas.” They suggested that performance measures ensure qualitative and quantitative measures and that they account for making positive community contacts; acknowledge the length of time and difficulty that clearing certain calls can take; acknowledge optional training programs and continuing education; include peer and supervisor assessments; and allow for the quality of reports to be considered as a metric for officer success and promotion.

10. Hiring

Focus group participants noted that the consent decree should require CPD to clearly establish minimum recruiting standards that reflect the skills and capabilities required to be an effective police officer. Participants suggested that these standards include a preference for individuals with military experience and noted that increasing the minimum recruiting and hiring standards would result in a more effective and professional department. Participants also perceived that the residency requirement prohibits CPD from attracting lateral transfers from nearby departments because it forces them to move within City limits. They suggested that the consent decree either remove this requirement or establish a process where officers with a certain number of years of service be eligible to live outside of the City of Chicago. Some also requested that the consent decree increase the recruiting standards so that people entering the academy are better-prepared for what they will experience. Participants lamented that recent recruit classes have included some less-than-desirable recruits who are only looking for a paycheck, which has impacted officer safety and decreased the overall professionalism of the department. By mandating recruitment standards through the consent decree, participants suggested that the department would improve officer safety and morale.

Discussion of Key Topics and Areas of Focus—Online Feedback

Additionally, PF solicited feedback from CPD officers regarding the items they felt should be included in the consent decree through an open comment box on a password-protected page on the PF website. The website address and password to access the comment box were posted on the CPD intranet, information regarding it was provided to CPD officers via email and during roll calls, and focus group attendees were also encouraged to inform their colleagues about the comment box. The open comment box, which was accessible for 17 days, allowed CPD officers to submit their responses anonymously.

The FOP issued a notice the day after the comment box was published that, “strongly suggest[ed] that FOP members do not participate in this web-based survey.”¹⁴ A total of 24 comments were submitted.¹⁵ The input mirrored the input gathered during the focus groups. To better organize the multiple items mentioned in many of the responses, the 24 responses were analyzed and coded into 17 broader topics with the following three topics being mentioned in more than two comments.

1. Merit-Based Promotional Process

More than half of the comments suggested the need to reform the existing merit-based promotional process and increase transparency throughout the process. Some of the comments suggested clearly defining and making the steps and standards for promotions consistent; prohibiting active CPD officers from serving as subject matter experts; and opening the process to all eligible CPD officers. Multiple comments also mentioned that the promotional exams should be administered more frequently, in accordance with national best practices.

Additionally, a number of the comments indicated that as a result of the merit-based promotional process, the department lacks true leadership. These comments indicated that the process lacks legitimacy and has led to the promotion of individuals who otherwise would not be leading components of the department. The commenters also insinuated that meritorious promotions have placed more of an emphasis on “who you know” than “what you know,” which has caused a “brain drain” amongst the leadership of the department. The comments suggest that CPD leadership is better at politics than policing. One comment stated, “[t]he only way to bring CPD leadership practices into the 21st century is to holistically review and revamp the promotional process from the ground up.”

¹⁴ Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge #7. Notice, “Focus Groups / Consent Decree.” April 11, 2018. See Appendix H of this report.

¹⁵ A full list of responses can be found in Appendix F of this report.

2. Political Involvement/Lack of Political Support

More than one-quarter of the comments mentioned a lack of support from elected officials. Multiple comments suggested that elected officials should support the police department by giving CPD officers the tools necessary to do their jobs and avoid indicting the department's policies and procedures in order to cater to potential voters. Another commenter advised that local elected officials should focus on allowing the department to reduce crime instead of criticizing the department. One comment specifically mentioned, "removing the mayor's influence over department leadership" because it creates a sense of needing to appease elected officials instead of effectively and safely running a law enforcement agency.

3. DOJ Investigation Report

Some comments criticized the year-long civil rights investigation conducted by DOJ into the practices of the CPD. The comments complained about both the investigation and the results. For example, one comment suggested that the investigation, "lacked specificity and contained nothing but anecdotal observations."

Conclusion

The Police Foundation commends the Illinois Attorney General's Office for recognizing the importance of gaining input on provisions of the consent decree from Chicago Police Department personnel. Officers' comments were thoughtful and well-intentioned. They expressed frustration and confusion about the consent decree process and many of the changes suggested and/or being made by the department. Participants in this process seemed truly concerned for the safety of the City and for their fellow Chicago police officers.

The reform process can serve as a bridge to help rebuild relationships between the community and the police in a common goal of public safety. As suggested in the Task Force Report on 21st Century Policing, "[A]dopting procedural justice as the guiding principle for internal and external policies and practices can be the underpinning of a change in culture and should contribute to building trust and confidence in the community."¹⁶

¹⁶ President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing. 2015. *Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing*. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/taskforce_finalreport.pdf (accessed June 26, 2018).

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Finally, PF would like to acknowledge the following organizations whose funding supported this work: the Albert Pick, Jr. Fund; the Chicago Community Trust; Chicago CRED; the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation; the Joyce Foundation; the Polk Bros. Foundation; and the Steans Family Foundation.

Appendix A. Detailed Methodology

The Illinois Attorney General’s Office solicited the Police Foundation (PF) to facilitate a series of 14 focus groups of sworn Chicago Police Department (CPD) officers, in addition to focus groups with law enforcement affinity groups in Chicago.¹⁷ PF facilitated a total of 13 focus groups that included 11 focus groups of randomly selected CPD officers and two with members of affinity groups. The reduction in the number of focus groups was due to (1) a scheduling error that affected one midnight focus group, (2) a cancellation of one focus group when all participants walked out after a member of the Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge #7 made a statement at the beginning of the focus group that deterred officer participation, and (3) the combination of two concurrent focus groups. The CPD focus groups were held during April 10-13, 2018 at CPD headquarters. Focus groups with members of two affinity groups were held on April 11 and April 25, 2018. All told, PF held focus groups with a total of 170 CPD officers. The focus groups contained CPD commanders, captains, lieutenants, sergeants, patrol officers, FTOs, and PPOs.

Sampling

PF received an Excel file containing the area, watch, and rank of 7,102 sworn CPD officers in the Bureau of Patrol. CPD’s jurisdiction is divided into three areas: North, Central, and South. CPD has four watches: first watch (midnight shift), second watch (day shift), third watch (evening shift), and fourth watch (special assignments that do not line up with the traditional watch schedules, such as school resource officers). Frequency distributions for these variables shows that 87.68% of the selected CPD sworn officers are patrol officers, 9.25% are sergeants, 2.6% are lieutenants, etc. The sampling strategy used by PF was programmed in a way that required the characteristics of our sample to match the characteristics of the CPD officers provided with respect to area, watch, and rank.

Sampling was conducted without replacement using Stata—a statistical software program that includes the function of random sampling. In the first round of sampling, 450 officers were selected to participate in the focus groups. The composition of the sample of 450 officers closely mirrors the composition of the sample of 7,102 officers provided by CPD.

CPD expressed some concerns that because of requirements to testify in court cases and other obligations, it would be more difficult to recruit available officers working during the second watch (day shift). Therefore, a decision was made to oversample this population within the department and an additional 100 officers working the second watch were added to the sample.

¹⁷ The number of CPD focus groups was selected by the Illinois Attorney General’s Office to mirror the 14 community meetings that they facilitated during the process.

This sampling process identified a total of 550 sworn officers who were randomly selected to participate in the focus groups.¹⁸ CPD received the random sample of 550 sworn officers and removed from that sample officers who were unavailable to attend focus groups during their watch because of other commitments or because they were scheduled to be out. Ultimately, 170 officers attended the CPD and affinity group focus groups. Participants in the affinity group focus groups self-selected, and were not randomly selected to participate.

Focus Group Structure

All CPD focus groups were held at CPD Headquarters. The focus groups were scheduled throughout the day—at 11:00 am, 5:30 pm, 8:00 pm, and 12:30 am—and participants were assigned to a particular focus group. The two affinity group focus groups were held at a time and location selected by the groups and followed the same structure and process as the CPD focus groups.

While participants were required by their supervisors to report to CPD Headquarters for their assigned focus groups, once the focus groups began attendees were given the option of participating in the discussion or not by the group facilitator and through an Informed Consent form provided to each participant.¹⁹ No sign-ins were conducted and PF team members did not know the names, badge numbers, or randomly assigned numbers of the officers in the groups. Nominal Group Technique (NGT) was used during the focus groups to gain input from participants. “NGT gathers information by asking individuals to respond to questions posed by a moderator, and then asking participants to prioritize the ideas or suggestions of all group members.”²⁰ Focus group attendees were provided five dots to place next to the items they felt were the most important; however, some chose not to participate or put multiple dots next to the same item. All comments were given with the assurance that while input was documented verbatim and would be included in this report, no names or other attribution would be given to participants.

Of the 170 people that attended:

- 165 remained after reading the informed consent form, which informed individuals of their rights, including that they were able to leave the focus group at any time.
- 155 remained for the entirety of the focus group or meeting. Some individuals left early to attend to other obligations.²¹

¹⁸ A copy of the CPD Bureau of Patrol message can be found in Appendix G of the report.

¹⁹ A full copy of the Informed Consent form can be found in Appendix B of this report.

²⁰ “Gaining Consensus Among Stakeholders Through the Nominal Group Technique.” Evaluation Briefs. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. No. 7: November 2006. <https://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/evaluation/pdf/brief7.pdf> (accessed June 26, 2018).

²¹ These numbers do not include the 12 officers who walked out after the FOP member made a statement and after reading the informed consent form.

When participants arrived for their focus group, the training room table was set up in a U-Shape where officers sat during the focus group discussion. Each group was staffed by three PF staff members—a group facilitator, a co-facilitator (tasked with documenting input on flip-charts) and a note-taker who took notes on a computer. Focus group facilitators included Chief (Ret.) Dan Isom, II, PhD and Chief (Ret.) Darrel Stephens.²² Each focus group ran essentially the same way as outlined below:

Introduction. The facilitator and co-facilitator introduced themselves, and the facilitator gave a short background of who they are and why they were there. The facilitator explained the purpose of and process to be used for the focus group, and ensured the group understood. The facilitator then read each group the Informed Consent for Officers Form, and ensured copies of the statement were at each place on the table. The facilitator then reviewed group logistics, methodology, breaks, and how information gathered will be used and shared. The facilitator then answered any other questions posed by the group.

Brainstorming Question 1. The facilitator then asked Question 1 and posted it on a white board. The question was, **“What are the biggest challenges you face in doing your job safely and effectively as a Chicago Police Officer?”** The facilitator explained as necessary and allowed up to 5 minutes of silence for everyone to think about the question and jot down ideas as they come to them. The facilitator then invited each person to provide one item, going in a sequential order, until all items were recorded. The co-facilitator recorded all items, in words as close as possible to those used by the contributor. The facilitator checked back with participants to ensure the item was captured accurately. No discussion or evaluation of ideas was conducted during this time. The group continued to generate and record ideas until all participants confirmed they had no additional ideas.

Discussion Question 1. Once all input was collected, the group discussed, combined, and reorganized each item. Wording changed only when the item’s originator agreed. The discussion clarified meaning, explained logic or analysis, raised and answered questions, or stated agreement or disagreement.

Prioritization of Question 1 Ideas. Once a comprehensive list was complete, all participants were provided with five dot stickers. They were then asked to place their stickers on the items that they believe to be the most important items on the flipchart. The group note-taker then tallied items with stickers and how many each item had, resulting in the priority of each item.

Repeat for Question 2. The group was then given a five-minute break, after which they repeated the entire process above with Question 2, which was **“What can the consent decree do to address those challenges, support officer safety, and enhance service to the community?”**

²² Detailed biographies of Chiefs Isom and Stephens can be found in Appendix C of this report.

Once all input was recorded and prioritized and all discussions concluded, the facilitator took final questions, thanked officers for their participation and excused them.

Thematic Coding of Topics

After each focus group, researchers entered the number of votes each item received in an Excel spreadsheet. Items in this spreadsheet were grouped into broader underlying topics. The first round of coding was completed by two members of the PF team and were then reviewed by the rest of the team.

For Question 1, a total of 295 specific items were noted by the participants and documented by PF staff. Many of the same items were identified across focus groups.²³ To better organize the items and account for the overlaps, the specific items were coded into 15 broader topics—listed alphabetically below—with some containing multiple subcategories that were used to differentiate the larger topics.

- Accountability
- Communications
- Department Culture
- Equipment & Technology
- Hiring
- Lack of Proactive Policing
- Lack of Support
- Miscellaneous
- Officer Safety and Wellness
- Performance Measures
- Expanded Role of Police
- Policies
- Promotions
- Staffing Shortages
- Training

For Question 2, a total of 134 specific items were noted by the participants and documented by PF staff.²⁴ Like question one, many of the responses to this question were similar across the focus groups. To better organize the items and account for the overlaps, the specific items were coded into 13 broader topics—listed alphabetically below—with some containing multiple subcategories that were used to differentiate the larger topics:

- Accountability
- Communications
- New & Maintained Equipment, Technology and Facilities
- Hiring
- Increased Support
- Miscellaneous
- Officer Safety and Wellness
- Performance Measures
- Enhanced Policies
- Promotional Process
Transparency & Improvements
- Scope of Work
- Staffing
- Increased, Enhanced & Mandated Training

²³ A full list of the responses can be found in Appendix D of this report.

²⁴ A full list of the responses can be found in Appendix E of this report.

The codes and subcategories, as well as each of and the individual items that were coded under each category, can be found in Appendices D and E of this report.

Online Comment Box

PF created an online comment box on their website to allow all sworn CPD officers to provide input. The website address and password to access the comment box was posted on the CPD intranet and information regarding it was provided to CPD staff via emails from CPD's Policy and Procedure, Research and Development Division. Focus group attendees were also encouraged to inform their colleagues about the comment box by the CPD Lieutenant at the beginning of the focus groups. Officers were also reminded of the comment box during roll calls. The comment box was open for 17 days. The FOP issued a notice the day after the comment box was published that "strongly suggest[ed] that FOP members do not participate in this web-based survey."²⁵ A total of 24 comments were submitted, which mirrored the input gathered during the focus groups.

²⁵ Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge #7. Notice "Focus Groups / Consent Decree." April 11, 2018. See Appendix H of this report.

Appendix B. Informed Consent Form (Provided to all Focus Groups Participants)



Informed Consent for Police Officers

Organizational Survey and Focus Groups: Chicago Police Department

April 2018

Overview of the Project

The National Police Foundation has reached an understanding with the Office of the Illinois Attorney General (AG) to hold focus groups to solicit feedback from Chicago Police Department (CPD) employees—leadership, rank and file. The project goal is to gather input from CPD staff regarding department strengths and challenges to provide employees a voice in the consent decree negotiation process.

About Your Participation

Your participation in this 60 - 90 minute focus group is entirely voluntary. If you agree to participate, you will be asked questions about your experiences with your job, your supervisor, and the department. The project team from the National Police Foundation will not receive your name from CPD and will not be collecting any identifying information during the meeting. Please note that we will do everything we can possibly do to protect your identity during and after this focus group. Additionally, the National Police Foundation will encourage all participants to keep everything said in the room confidential. However, as you are likely to know at least some of the other officers in the room (or they may know you), we cannot guarantee that what you say will not be shared publicly by other participants. If for any reason, you feel uncomfortable sharing information with any or all the other participants in the focus group, please only share that which you feel safe providing.

By participating in this interview/focus group, I agree to the following:

I have been informed that as with any focus group, I may perceive advantages and disadvantages of participation. The focus group does require a commitment of my time and a willingness to provide honest information whenever possible.

In any written reports or oral presentations of the results, my name will not be associated with statements and opinions I provide, unless I give my explicit permission and provide my name for this purpose. I understand that the Police Foundation will use the information I provide for general assessment purposes only and I acknowledge that the focus group team plan to present

aggregate or summary results only. This means that any reported results will include analysis and interpretation of responses based only on groups large enough to where no person can be individually identified (for example, male officers). I have been advised by the Police Foundation that they will not disclose information that would identify me to anyone in CPD, the City or the Illinois Attorney General's Office or anyone else outside of the project without my permission. At the same time, I have been informed that the Police Foundation team cannot control what other participants disclose after the focus group session, so I will be careful not to say anything that I would not want repeated outside the room.

Also, I have been informed herein that if I agree to participate in the focus group, I may withdraw at any time, or choose to not answer some questions.

I have been assured that if I choose to withdraw²⁶, I will not be asked to provide any more answers to additional questions, except for the reason for my withdrawal (and even then, I do not have to answer that question).

There will be no penalties or negative consequences if I decide to skip any questions or stop participating altogether. If I choose to stop participating during the session I am free to leave.

If I have any questions, concerns, or complaints, I may feel free to contact any of the people listed below by email or phone during regular business hours.

CONTACTS

If your concern is about the focus group, or your participation, please contact:

Blake Norton
Chief Operating Officer
Principal Investigator (PI)/ Project Director
National Police Foundation
1201 Connecticut Ave, N.W. Suite 200
Washington D.C. 20036-2636
bnorton@policefoundation.org
Tel: 202-833-1460

²⁶ If I choose to withdraw, I may elect to call or email or leave a voice message for Blake Norton.

Appendix C. Focus Group Facilitator Biographies

Chief (Ret.) Daniel Isom II, Ph.D.

Daniel Isom was Chief of Police for the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department from 2008 and 2013. He is currently the E. Desmond Lee Professor of Policing and the Community at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. He also serves as a Police Foundation Executive Fellow.

After leaving the police department, Isom served as the Public Safety Director for the state of Missouri and as a member of the Ferguson Commission, which produced recommendations on how to transform the St. Louis region in the wake of the 2014 shooting death of Michael Brown, Jr. in Ferguson, Mo. Isom was co-chair of the working group on Citizen-Law Enforcement Relations for the Commission. Isom's research interests include police management, police misconduct and use of force. As a 2013 Eisenhower Fellow, Isom studied community policing and police training in Ireland and Germany.

A member of the Metropolitan Police Department for 24 years until his retirement in 2013, Isom held a variety of positions within the department. Prior to his promotion as Chief of Police, he worked as the special projects assistant to the Chief, responsible for the planning and implementation of all department community-based initiatives. Previously, he served as commander of several districts as well as the St. Louis Police Academy, head of internal affairs, and he also worked in the internal audit unit and the juvenile division. Isom is a progressive advocate for elevating the standards of professionalism for law enforcement and strengthening the relationship between the police and citizens. His policing philosophy is based on the founder of modern police departments, Sir Robert Peel, who stated almost 200 years ago, "The people are the police and the police are the people."

Isom holds bachelor's, master's and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Missouri-St. Louis in criminology and criminal justice and a master's degree in public administration from St. Louis University. He is also a graduate of the FBI National Academy, the Police Executive Forum Senior Management Institute (PERF) and the FBI National Executives Institute.

Chief (Ret.) Darrel Stephens

Darrel Stephens currently serves as a consultant and an Executive Fellow with the Police Foundation. He is an accomplished police executive with 48 years of experience. His career began as a police officer in Kansas City, Missouri in 1968. In addition to his police experience, he served for 2 years as the City Administrator in St. Petersburg, Florida—a community of 250,000 people—where he was responsible for a work force of approximately 3,000 employees and a budget of \$380 million. He has 22 years of experience in a police executive capacity including almost nine years from September 1999 to June 2008 as the Chief of Police of the 2,100-member Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD). He served as the Executive Director of the Major Cities Chiefs Association from October 2010 through October 2017.

Perhaps best known for advancing innovative approaches to policing, Stephens has earned a national reputation as a leader in policing. He served as the President, Vice President and Legislative Committee Chair of the Major Cities Police Chiefs Association while Chief in Charlotte. Throughout his career, he has taken on difficult and challenging opportunities, and championed strategic technology investments to enhance employee productivity. He is frequently called on to provide guidance on policing issues. He served as a technical advisor to the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing. He has served as a member of the Innocence Project Board of Directors from 2011 through 2016. He has authored a number of publications on various topics related to policing and has served as a consultant and speaker promoting progressive policing approaches. He received the Police Executive Research Forum's Leadership Award and was elected as a Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration in 2005. In 2006, he was awarded an Honorary Doctorate of Law Degree from Central Missouri State University. In 2010 he was inducted into the Evidence-Based Policing Hall of Fame and received the Distinguished Achievement Award in Evidence-Based Crime Policy, both presented by George Mason University's Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy. In 2017 he received the Sir Robert Peel Medal for Evidence Based Policing from the Police Executive Program at Cambridge University. He also received the Major Cities Chiefs Association 2017 Leadership Award.

Appendix D. Full List of Responses to Question 1—Items Organized by Topic

The following represents a full list of the responses to Question 1, “**What are the biggest challenges you face in doing your job safely and effectively as a Chicago Police Officer?**” Items are organized by topic.

Accountability
No accountability from administration (outside agencies DOJ)
Swiping in
Swiping In (like punching a timeclock)
COPA needs to be disempowered from investigating officer shootings because they're completely biased against police and technically illegal under state law (except Chicago, which is Home Rule)
COPA's influence on the media and the effect it has on the public and their ability to trust the community
Nothing positive about COPA
Officers are apprehensive with their decision-making even when they are following department policy because of COPA
Outside opinions (COPA), scrutiny on police actions causing officers to second guess themselves
Perception of COPA as a knee-jerk reaction
War on police - COPA
We have to worry about being sued for making tough split-second decisions, and we're being judged by civilians (COPA)
When COPA completes an investigation years ago, they reopened the case for the third time. As officers, we need to have some assurance that once a case is investigated and ruled on it should be closed. There should be a statute of limitations
Accountability for Police Officers focused on the wrong thing.
Being a male white officer during the tensions between public and the police
Completion of ISR/Fear of negative repercussions/discipline for ISRs
Fear of doing the wrong thing
Fear of lawsuits
Fear of lawsuits and getting fired
Fear of negative repercussions/discipline for incorrect BWC use
Officer second guessing themselves and fear of repercussions
Officers are afraid to do their jobs
Officers are afraid to do their jobs because of lawsuits / consent decrees, etc.
Officers are second guessing themselves
Officers fear of unjustified prosecution

Repercussions of doing your job
Younger guys are more afraid of what's going to happen afterwards
Fear of getting second guessed and not wanting to mess up and getting in trouble
Getting used to the cameras and not allowing them to cause second guessing
Lack of support brings fear of doing the job and young officers second guessing
Second guessing
Second-guessing situations by a lot of officers
Everything seems to be under a microscope/Too much oversight
Police are handcuffed (racial profiling is overblown)
The demographics of the people we're dealing with have nothing to lose because they're criminals and we have everything to lose
We're constantly being looked at under a microscope/People are afraid of doing the job/ We're being crucified by media and CPD is portrayed as the bad guys/Poor morale
Communications
External
Communication with citizens
News Cycle vs. Due Process - News doesn't need to be truthful and police are stuck with perception (which becomes reality)
We need a spokesperson within the department that actually speaks to the media to inform the general public about the officer side of things
Internal
Communication with one another on the street
Internal Communication - officers should get info before media.
Policies and laws change and our department doesn't actually tell us how to do things the right way. Development and dissemination is not done well and there is no practical application provided to us.
Department Culture
Coworkers that lack cultural competency
Department does not have an us/us mentality
Do what you need to do and be the officer that they expect and put individual effort/Teaching officers how to interact so that the community doesn't always perceive us as being negative
Peer culture - I have a dangerous job so I do the job as I see fit
Growth and understanding of the community in which you serve
Have to drag police officers to change
Officers aren't articulating what they're doing properly
Women work 10x as hard to prove themselves
Females being in a male dominated profession - makes the work difficult
"Do as I say" mentality

Divergence between old officers and new officers/Culture conflict regarding policing. Creates tension/People feel bullied by the new way of thinking
Lack of longevity/experience officers
Officers struggling to adapt to new form of policing/Struggling with the new methods of policing. Conflict with "old way vs. new way"
The current environment is making the police softer and the training is now based more on talking/de-escalation than on talking
Times have changed
Younger hires (millennials) have created a culture with age cohort
Younger officers don't understand chain of command
Millennials
Black officers hear the criticism first and "get it first from every angle"
Double whammy for blacks (lack of public support and lack of internal support)
Female black supervisor does not get respect from all male officers, all race subordinates
Equipment and Technology
Body cameras
District buildings are in poor shape
Equipment
Equipment - not maintained
Equipment (radios aren't encrypted and offenders can listen to what we're doing)
Equipment (working cars, phones, computers, the necessity things that we need don't work or aren't readily available)
Equipment issues
Equipment that doesn't work
Equipment/Technology
Equipment/Technology always broken
Lack of cars and poor facilities
Lack of equipment
Not enough equipment for existing FTOs (cage-less cars)
Not enough in car computers
Not enough vehicles
Poor equipment
Proper equipment (software systems, MDT placement, computers inside the stations, vehicles)
SST phones - not enough
Too much equipment to keep track of
Working equipment (vehicles, computers, radios don't work on a daily basis)
Hiring
Entrance exam is a joke

Lowering standards to hire people
Manpower / Staffing levels are low. Recruiting is difficult. Pushing low standard people through the Academy.
Quality of the recruits and the PPOs
The administration never fires anyone or washes out any of the bad recruits
Lack of Proactive Policing
ACLU involvement in policing has negatively impacted our job because we're not as likely to stop people
Breakdown between the community and the police, which in large part is impacted by the drop of the contact card in favor of the ISR
Fear, by younger officers, of putting their hands on people
ISRs - makes people reluctant to do their job. Makes officers feel like ACLU may be fishing
ISRs - the document when we do street stops. They're in-depth, time-consuming, and are immediately transferred to the ACLU, which will call the suspect and try to challenge anything
Motivating police officers to do their job when they're worried about being sued when they have everything (pension, family, life, etc.) on the line
Not being able to be proactive because of all of the processes that we have to do and the potential for us to forget something small/accountability requirements that will end up with us getting jammed up
Officers afraid to do their job
Police are restricted by what we can do
Lack of Support
Criminal Justice System
ASA support and accountability
Criminal Justice system (including prosecution/courts) not operating the way it should
Felony arrest vetting process
Lack of public trust in justice system
Lack of support from judicial system
Police officers do not have credibility from judge
Punishment not strict enough or enforced
SA won't prosecute and knocks down charges
Stronger sentencing especially for violent offenders
Community Support
Citizens/Jurors are much more receptive of defendants than they are of police
community distrust - us against them
Community does not value officers who go above and beyond
Community has lack of respect for police
Community is uneducated about PO's job, what they are required to do, law, etc.

Community needs to buy into process - this is a 'together' process
Community won't provide information
Disrespect from our own community
Failure to comply with police officers
Increased scrutiny with cameras
Lack of community education of what police officers do
Lack of community support
Lack of respect for authority.
Lack of social support (We second guess every action. CPD is constantly under the microscope)
Lack of support for POs from community
Lack of support from community
Lack of support from public
Negative perception of the police / no positive
Negative public perception
Perception of the police by the community
Police community trust
Public attitude - nowadays everybody knows the law
Public doesn't understand the challenges we face and our ability to resolve them
Public Perception
Public perception/CPD is a punching bag
Public perception/misperception
Public trust
Relationship between people in the community and the police.
Society's lack of respect for the police
The disconnect between public perception of what CPD does
Department (CPD) Support
Brothers/Sisters in blue not embraced by all
Bureaucracy
Command staff needs to back us up and support us
Department does not have the officers' back
Department support
Disparity in discipline
Lack of support from supervisors
Lack of support from the administration
Lack of support from the command structure.
Lack of support internally, particularly from CPD leadership
Lack of transparency in discipline process (not in notes, in picture)
Lift morale

Micromanagement that the department puts on the sergeants to further micromanage their officers. Sergeants are required to do so much paperwork that they can't get on the streets to do the work that they need to do
Officers don't feel like they can make an honest mistake
Peer pressure does not allow officers to speak up
Supervision challenges
supervisors do not provide adequate support
Supervisors' lack of interest for those they serve
Supervisors that lack knowledge, people skills, and compassion
Support and respect from command staff
Support from supervisors
Trust and support from administration
Media
How we are portrayed in the media
Media - quick to demonize police; giving unfair
Media not giving the full story or doing what they have to sell the story
Media
Media/Cellphones constant oversight
Misconceptions being represented as truths
Misperceptions in the press/Media perspective
Negative media narrative
Negative media portrayal
Negativity from the media
Slanted social media
We're being portrayed negatively everywhere we go
Elected Officials
City needs to start fighting lawsuits against police department
City pays out lawsuits too fast
Cops should be judging cops not politicians/Political support
Impartiality (administration, political powers/structure)
Lack of political support
Lack of political support
Lack of support from the City
Lack of support from the city to investigate complaints against officers. The city settles too quickly
Pension should be funded
Political agendas driving decisions (BWCs for example).
Political influence "Machine"

Politicians/elected officials take side of criminals over police / Too much involvement by City Hall
Positive public relations from the city - if the mayor and council backed us more
Support from administration and politicians
Miscellaneous
Consent decree based on anecdotal data
No follow through to fix issues
Retaining composure and professionalism when we're always on camera
Too much paperwork
Officer Safety and Wellness
Internal Partnerships
Lack of adequate mental health resources for CPD officers
No steady partners, no familiarity with the person I'm working with and what they're thinking
Officer foot pursuit technology/Safety tracking
Officer safety and wellness. Caring for officers who are impacted by all events on the job. EAP - officers are not comfortable accessing those services
Weapons easily available to those on the street
Morale
Demoralized
DOJ poor influence on CPD morale - ACLU
No cohesion in uniforms
PD feels like a battered spouse
Performance Measures
Activity-based performance measures (quotas)
Numbers issue is poorly defined. Where do the numbers come from?
Supervision - too numbers based. Too strict. Undue pressure
We're a numbers-based department instead of effort-based. People are forced to do things that they may not need to do just to be "seen" and have a number. The department has been demanding quotas even though they won't call it that
Expanded Role of Police
CFD is requesting our presence at calls, but it impacts our ability to do calls
City wants the police department to be proactive
Constantly being put in a no-win situation/Better call screening
Dealing with family issues that they turn into police issues / Dealing with all social ills that are not police/crime-related
Dealing with people with mental health issues, particularly those who are violent
Officers have misconception of their role and get tunnel vision. They think it's not my job. Traditional policing vs service
Police being asked to handle all issues without proper training in those areas

Police held accountable for every social ill
Should narrow police focus, not broaden it
We're no longer proactive, only reactive/Can't do our jobs
Policies
Car chases - policy is so restrictive because liability has outweighed law.
Catch 22s (for example, uncertainty with use of Taser)
Discipline is inconsistent across the department
General orders should be easier to digest and more user-friendly
Interpretations of the policies are not clear at all
Intimidated by the policies the department writes for us
Limiting our options for secondary employment
Narrow interpretation of 4th amendment
Policies (especially use of force) are confusing
Policies in general too restrictive
Public involvement in creating policy
Residency requirement
Rolling out policies is a rushed process and we're expected to know it as soon as it's issued
Too many policies
Use of force
Use of force policies
Vehicle chase policy is too restrictive
We should just be CALEA accredited so that we don't have to go through separate processes with the city, the county, the state, etc.
Promotions
Internal Procedural Justice
No advancement for police officers (the promotional exam is administered too infrequently)
Promotional process needs to be revamped
Scheduling of promotional exams
We need a command staff that has actually been merit-promoted and go back to promoting people that have actually done real police work because they're the ones making the decisions that got us to where we are now
Staffing Shortages
Command staff incompetence to allocate appropriately
Lack of manpower
Lack of manpower - training
Lack of officers - staffing levels
Manpower
Manpower issues

Manpower shortage
Not enough manpower
Patrol assignments are disparate
Staffing levels and allocation of manpower
There's not enough time to do your job
Training
Lack of proper training
Lack of training
Midnights don't get training - they have to change their hours/shift in to be able to train
More training
Need practical, scenario-based and situational training, not just book training
Not enough real-world training
Scenario-based training has gone away in lieu of computer-based training
Should train on work shift
Training
Training - experiential/ongoing
Training - Video-based training is not good enough
Training (need more hands-on training)
Training is not long enough
Training is punitive
Police Academy
Academy is a joke
Academy is overcrowded. Facilities are no good. Feels rushed
Academy is overrated
Academy not challenging enough
Academy training
Increased qualification for the range
Instructors do not have enough experience
Mandatory force mitigation training
No power test effective 2018
People make it through the academy that should not
Resources/training - academy is theory
Severe lack of organization in the academy
Firearms Qualification
Don't shoot enough - training
Firearms training and qualification should be more than once a year
FTO Program
FTO program

FTO Program is a joke / needs an overhaul. No accountability for police officers from FTO. No incentives or training for FTOs
FTO program not consistent
FTOs are motivated for wrong reason
FTOs should want to help us
No oversight over field training
PPOs not prepared after FTO
The FTO program is overcrowded and there's no incentive to be an FTO
In-service Training
Continued training (both physical and tactical, and updated policies/book)
Everyone should be trained in CIT
More structured In-Service training giving officers the knowledge to understand effective policing strategies
Need more CIT training. CFS [Calls for service] for MH [mental health] issues have skyrocketed
Needs CIT training
Now everyone is requesting a CIT-trained officer for dealing with persons with mental disabilities, but we've been dealing with them my entire 20+ year career, but we have to be trained by it
Training - not enough time to take the training
Training. (No In-Service; Not enough qualify; tactical training; active shooter training (in academy only)

Appendix E. Full List of Responses to Question 2—Items Organized by Topic

The following represents a full list of the responses to Question 2, “What can the consent decree do to address those challenges, support officer safety, and enhance service to the community?” Items are organized by topic.

Accountability
Ability of civil rights organizations and other civilians to have complete right to determine policies
Discipline - restorative justice practices
Federal agency reviews in 72 hours
Knee jerk reaction to a few bad incidents
No swiping in and out
Public accountability
Review and reform complaint process, reception & investigation
Set guidelines for civilian oversight
Streamline discipline process
Supervisors need to be held accountable on the streets - not enough supervisors
COPA ability to investigate Chicago officer involved shootings
Mandate that police expertise be required in COPA investigations
Training for COPA-what are the requirements?
Don't penalize officers for following laws
Indemnification
Limit punitive damages
Second guessing
Communication
Limit the release of information/video before trial to not influence case
Department does a terrible job of explaining actions
Increase internal communication
Span of control
Transparency and internal communication that allows for understanding in the public on the actual issues during a critical incident
New and Maintained Equipment, Technology, and Facilities
Are the proper equipment/training provided to officers to reduce use of force? -taser
Better equip officers
Equipment standards (in your car, the Toughbook, and in the stations)
Improved Equipment

Invest in newer equipment to help us fight crime with technology
Need working computers
Not enough vehicles
Proper resource allocation for the fleet
Require better equipment
Require better/improved facilities.
Require properly funded equipment, training and facilities
Update technology
Hiring
Preference for military experience
Recruiting standards
Increased Support
Citizen police academies
City and CPD should work together to put out ads/educational campaign about listening to police officers and importance of compliance from the public
Educate citizens
More funds/resources to help build bridges with the community
Provide public education for the community
Public does not understand the decision-making process
Internal procedural justice
Requests up the chain of command are not honored
Balance paying out very quickly sends wrong message
Fully funded pension/City needs to be required to keep up with its obligations
Keep politics out of policing
More support from politicians
Pensions should be fully funded by city
Political support for the police department
Politics/election year pressure
Require fully funded pension
Resources for everyone at CPD across the board
Set some sort of parameter where we can catch up to our pension. The city has to reach a certain amount by a certain time or they can be penalized for us
Time frame, metrics for consent decree
Miscellaneous
Contract allows for officers to leave assignments that might be more reflective of one's race
Nothing ²⁷

²⁷ One focus group participant indicated that the consent decree could do nothing to address their challenges, support officer safety, or enhance service to the community.

Officer Safety and Wellness
Increase MH [mental health] resources for officers
Mandating EAP [Employee Assistance Program] - officer safety wellness
Officer safety needs to be prioritized in all areas of consent decree requirements
Performance Measures
Elimination of numbers-based policing/No more quotas
Ensure that state legislation and departmental policies are aligned/Reconsider and review numbers-based performance metrics
Get rid of CompStat
Limit the impact of ISRs on the numbers-base. Take into account calls-for-service, report writing, going to community meetings, etc.
Enhanced Policies
Clarity of general orders/policies (e.g. Taser use)
Eliminate residency requirement
Legal process that defines what happens if an officer is involved in a complaint/Complaint reception/investigation process should be clearly defined
Lift residency requirement
Limit the requirements of the ISRs/Process of ISRs/Reconsider ISR issue with officer safety perspective
New positions to oversee diversity
Our department guidelines, particularly use of force, should better mirror state statutes
Pedestrian Stop Report created by the Illinois Department of Transportation should be used by CPD/Have the State AG's office mandate a form that should be used and stop reporting to the ACLU
Policies aren't always black-and-white and we need to have the assurance that if we don't follow policy exactly we won't be punished. We need to have verbiage in our policies that allow us to do our job. Ensure officers are provided the opportunity to use discretion to protect themselves
Prioritize what helps officers (maybe implement process that allows officer input into policies/procedures/changes)
Time limit on contract negotiations
Promotional Process Transparency and Improvements
Define promotional process (planning)
Define promotional process (role of FTO)
Improve promotional process; more frequent tests
Incentivize good police officers who want to stay officers
Increase opportunities for advancement
Language that mandates the changes of merit-based promotions and more transparency with your score on the exam
No clear guidelines for promotion

Outside agency implementing promotional exams
Promote sergeants to enhance beat integrity and supervision
Promotional process consistent
Reform promotional testing process
Transparent promotional testing process
Scope of Work
Create resources for diversion of mental health calls
Staffing
Address investigative units
Better staffing better policing
Clearly define process for staffing allocation
Create incentives for working in certain districts
Education mandate
Examine staffing schedules
Fully staff the department
Increase staffing to assist with community policing duties
Male dominated department - women are not decision makers - especially black women
Manpower workload analysis
Manpower-officer job is being watered down
Manpower-sliding scale for tasks
Require clearly defined supervisor to officer ratio.
Require staffing study/review to address allocation of resources
Require the city to hire more police officers
Staffing plan
Understand the cost benefit analysis
Unrealistic hiring plan
Increased, Enhanced, and Mandated Training
Create legitimate training - not check the box
Develop comprehensive strategy for all training
Improved Training Program
Lack of training
Need a comprehensive approach to training for officers/community
Prioritize training for all officers
Require better training that keeps up with the changing times and better communication of the changing policies and laws
Require better training
Taser 2015 incident not fully trained
Training to change behavior - bias

Value effective trainings that enhance officer safety and reduce use of force
We lack a lot of the training that other departments have
Academy & Field Training
Require higher Academy standards (physical especially); need more instructors
Review the screening process, the training they receive in the academy, and all the way through
Training should be done when you're in the academy, not after you're already on the street
Incentivized FTO program
Firearms Qualification
Rifle qualifications - need to know someone
In-service
Better training for new supervisors (include more SMEs [subject matter experts])
Better training for new supervisors (lessons from private sector)
Better training for new supervisors (train new supervisors check-in)
Consistent application of training
Mandate training
Mandatory training requirements and consistent in-service training
Mandatory CIT, force mitigation, range qualifications
Motivate officers to take training - rename classes "how not to get sued"
Officers trained two weeks a year- keep current with training
Review and increase the amount of in-service training at the academy in an organized fashion
Roll call training
There should be more mandatory situational training

Appendix F. Online Open Comment Box Responses

PF created an online comment box on its website to allow all sworn CPD officers to provide input. The website address and password to access the comment box was posted on the CPD intranet and information regarding it was provided to CPD staff via emails from CPD's Policy and Procedure, Research and Development Division. Focus group attendees were also encouraged to inform their colleagues about the comment box at the beginning of each focus group. Officers were also reminded of the comment box during roll calls. The comment box was open for 17 days. The FOP issued a notice the day after the comment box was published that "strongly suggest[ed] that FOP members do not participate in this web-based survey."²⁸ A total of 24 comments were submitted and are listed verbatim below.

Online Open Comment Box Responses

There will be no value in a consent decree that doesn't address the chronic problems of political favoritism and nepotism in the Department. These issues are most clearly visible in the promotional process. The entire process lacks legitimacy and is highly suspect. If members lack confidence in the promotional system, how can they have confidence in their leadership? And if there's no confidence in the leadership, how are the members supposed to follow and 'buy-in' to any reform or direction CPD brings about. The consent decree should address the promotions exams (content, frequency, transparent grading), address the cheating (which has been rampant for decades and has been identified through litigation), and address the merit system (which is just code for promoting your friends/family/secretaries/drivers). This is an opportunity to really do some good for the department as an organization, and restore legitimacy to our operations. Ignoring this topic (or leaving its enforcement to vague and weak) would be a disservice.

You guys really need to let the City and the Department know about the problems in the promotion process. The consent decree should state 1) how often exams will be administered (national average is every 2-3 years), 2) that no active CPD members will serve as SME's (to reduce the flagrant cheating), and 3) should revamp the 'merit' process to make it fairer, more transparent, and open to everyone. This would go a long way towards improving morale, increasing member buy-in, and providing positive career progression for our members.

²⁸ Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge #7. Notice "Focus Groups / Consent Decree." April 11, 2018. See Appendix H of this report.

Since I wasn't chosen for one of the focus groups and was never interviewed by either the DOJ or the Mayor's Commission I guess this is the only way for me to provide feedback to those revamping the CPD. In my four decades with the Department this biggest change that has had the most negative impact on the Department has been the merit promotion process. It is time for this failed social experiment to end. The merit process has resulted in two negative impacts that has led to many of the other problems the Department is facing. The first negative impact has been the loss in respect for all supervisors. The average officer thinks all supervisors were promoted through the merit process so they not only do not respect them personally, but they also don't respect their professional decisions. The second negative impact is a brain drain. The department is now run overwhelmingly by individuals who could not even pass a sergeant's exam. Many were meritorious detectives, meritorious sergeants, meritorious lieutenants and then Lt. commanders. They only had to pass the written portion of the exam which had a passing rate on only 60%, then never had to show their ability to think critically by taking and/or passing the second part of the exam. This has led to illegitimate leadership who's only way to legitimize their positions is by wearing all their award ribbons. Apparently, by wearing their ribbons the rest of us are expected to recognize them as legitimate leaders. It doesn't work, most officers see it for what it is. The arrogance and sense of entitlement displayed by these merit promotees is not good for either the Department or the City as a whole. The merit process must end.

I believe that it is absolutely critical that the consent decree between the IL-AG and CPD include drastic changes to the Department's promotional process. The processes for both rank-order and merit selection needs a complete overhaul as neither are in line with national best-practices. The sworn members of the Department have no faith in the current promotional process and do not believe that it is honest, fair, or transparent in any way. The process is ripe with cheating, abuse, nepotism, favoritism, and cronyism. Each and every aspect of the process (from the exam to the "merit" nomination/selection process) is cloaked in secrecy and is highly suspect. This results in not only low morale and low confidence in career progression/mobility, but also results in a less than optimal caliber of leadership in the Department. Instead of identifying and promoting the best and brightest amongst its member, CPD has, historically, preferred the clouded and the politically-connected. This needs to stop. The only way to bring CPD leadership practices into the 21st century is to holistically review and revamp the promotional process from the ground up. However, in the absence of concrete and accountable language in a court-enforced order – I fear that any efforts to reform this politically charged topic will be largely a "dog and pony show."

There should be promotional exams year round. Why is there always a minimum gap of 10 years in between promotional exams? ---- When people are promoted, why is that they are only sent to a district for a short period of time and then quickly whisked away to some special unit, with less than a year in the new position?? ----- Why do they open NOJO's, when they already have the specific people in mind who they want for the job and are usually less qualified?! It's like they open these NOJO's with the false hope that the selection process is actually legit and unbiased. It's a joke.

The promotional process in the Chicago Police Department is extremely demoralizing. The tests come around every 8-10 years and the merit process can only be described as a "slap in the face." People are getting promoted simply because of their relationship with bosses and city council members. Many of the promoted have never worked the street and barely have any time on the job. This has created a culture within the department where it has become difficult to acknowledge any supervisor (of all ranks) as such and that is not fair to those who have earned that position deserving.

With over 90% of the command staff having been promoted through the ranks "meritoriously" their is no hope for an average supervisor that has made it through the ranks by taking the promotional exams scoring high enough to be promoted to ever be considered for a promotion.

I would like to see a clear definition of "Merit," as it pertains to the promotional process. I would like members of each collective bargaining unit to be solicited for information and/or feedback prior to the implementation of any changes.

It is my firm belief that the DOJ 'investigation' was a monumental waste of money. If that 'study' was an academic paper it would have received a failing grade. It lacked specificity and contained nothing but anecdotal observations. Nothing was backed up by facts or specific examples. No study can be accepted as serious if it is void of hard facts. How any free thinking person can accept the DOJ study as a serious investigation is beyond me. The current DOJ administration is right in staying out of this mess. The misrepresentations and outright lies have been the death knell of proactive policing and has led to the unnecessary deaths of hundreds of Chicagoans. The persons involved in this 'study' and its flawed findings should be ashamed of themselves, they have blood on their hands.

I think a Consent Decree is a horrible idea. I am satisfied with the status quo. I believe monitoring and maintaining a consent decree would not serve the public as it would create a tax burden on every citizen of Chicago.

Maybe if promotions on the police department were actually legitimate, and the type of people being promoted weren't then maybe, but other it's a complete joke. She is seeking a consent decree to help Rahm force changes that we have in our contract. The mayor doesn't give a shit about the police department, he only cares about his re-election as Mayor. The police does need reform but so do the citizens that we protect.

Address the overworking of officers (ie. days off cancelled for certain teams or units) resulting in working 7-10 days in a row without a break. Should be limits on how and when they can cancel days

off - Also - 45min -1 hour a day for exercise or work out for officers during their work day to relieve stress.

Training and the lack of enough QUALIFIED supervisors needs to be addressed. Interestingly enough, just yesterday a Department of Aviation Security Officer announced a lawsuit for his lack of training. There is no listed criteria for merit promotions and most poor supervisors are products of merit promotions. Additionally, there should be a limit of one merit promotion to anyone that receives one

There is no support from the politicians in Chicago. COPA is does not have the training in state law or department policy to objectively make a determination in use of force incidents. Let's put them through some scenarios where they have to make split second decisions. Every time an incident happens, the media lets the small group of protestors get their message out. Where is the department to explain the actual law? In a recent incident from Elgin, where a woman with a knife was shot by an Elgin officer, the Elgin police chief was explaining to the demonstrators that the officer doesn't have to wait to be stabbed before the officers can protect themselves. Where is that support in Chicago?

We are also seeing the effects of years of merit promotions. Officers in leadership roles that aren't equipped to handle the day to day rigors of police work because they have never actually performed any functions of real police work. The same leaders that are calling for activity, have no idea about reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause. The call for activity during the comstat era caused officers to seek quantity over quality. Now all ISRs go to the ALCU to be scrutinized. And still the department wonders why there is not more proactive policing.

Because the Chicago Police Department let the ranks of its members dwindle to the lowest amount of officers during my career, there were insufficient in service training conduct to keep officers informed of new policies. There is no commitment to training and even if there was any attempt to properly train, there would not be enough officers on the street to cover for officers in training. Now that the department is seemingly making an effort to hire additional officers, this type of the mass hiring will not result in the best trained officers.

The efforts of the Illinois Attorney General are misguided and political. There are many flaws in the DOJ investigation and the results are Chicago having high crime rates and many neighborhoods are unsafe to live in. Police officers should be given the tools they need and support from their department, their politicians and the community as they try to serve and protect. The indictment into the practices of the department should be an indictment against the exempt members of the department, who let failed strategies become common practice.

This is all BS and a political ploy to aid and enable mayor Emanuel's re-election strategy. It is plain to see that he is attempting to put lipstick on a pig and call it police reform. Start by protecting your employees and provide them with a living wage.

The Chicago Police Department (CPD) is continually adopting new strategies in the fight against crime. For example, it has built intelligence centers in various districts in an attempt to respond faster to shots fired calls. CPD has also began a frenzied hiring spree in order to put more police officers on the street. Thus, in the spirit of fighting and solving crime, I am perplexed as to why the CPD has dwindled the Crime Lab down to (3) forensic investigators working on the street? Why has the CPD not replenished the ranks of the forensic investigators along with their specialized skillset (e.g., usage of the Leica laser system, etc.)? How is it that a major American city which is plagued with violent crime in vulnerable communities can have such a meager staff of highly trained forensic investigators? Will it take a forensic fumble in a high-profile homicide, disaster, or God forbid police shooting for the City of Chicago to realize that it needs a well staffed team of forensic investigators? If the CPD truly wants to have genuine "CHANGE" in its way of serving and protecting its citizens, I suggest it should have a well trained staff of forensic investigators in order to effectively catch, arrest, and successfully convict the evil element which plagues our city. Thank you for any and all consideration with regard to this matter.

A consent decree is very damaging to the department. When allowing politicians and civilians to dictate what and how a police officer is to conduct himself while he is in performance of his duties is extremely dangerous to the public and to the officer. As a detective who reviews a lot of officers body cameras I have noticed officers are becoming more and more reluctant to put handcuffs on the individuals they are stopping. This failure has caused more officers to be battered. As a veteran of over 22 years on this job, every time I stopped more than one person the handcuffs went on. I told who I was stopping that this was done for their safety and for mine and guess what the results were? I NEVER fought with anybody, EVER and I NEVER got a CR number, go figure!! Today, officers have to document why they are stopping someone, why they are searching someone and why handcuffs may have been put on an individual and that is an absolute shame. Because of this officers are not stopping as many people which means the bad guys can now pretty much walk and drive freely without worry that an officer may stop them. The result, more murders, shootings, robberies, carjackings. Sad. Having civilians and politicians dictate the use of force protocol for officers is an embarrassment. Until one walks in an officers shoes, I really don't think you have the right to tell an officer when he can or can't use deadly force. I don't think you have the authority to tell an officer what piece of equipment he should use in a particular situation. But, the mayor is desperate for votes so he allows this backwards strategy to move forward, tragic. Officer training, I'm in for it. Accountability? Really? Why do you think that the last promotional exam is for lieutenant? Let's fix that problem. Why can two officers get in trouble for the exact same thing and one officer takes 20 days and the other takes 2? The same reason there is no promotional exam after lieutenant that's why. This system is beyond broke, a consent decree will do nothing except lower, if that's possible,

officer moral and will be the final nail in making sure officers do nothing proactive, which is exactly what the politicians and the criminals want.....Sad. The bottom line is criminals don't want to be stopped, harassed, talked to and I never thought that the day would come when laws would be in place to make sure that does happen, no more stops, no more harassing. I never thought I would see the day when we allow the criminals to win, wrong becomes right. A criminals word is more believable then an officers word. Really Tragic times in Chicago and my fear is it's only going to get worse.

One of the most important things that needs to be done is to establish some type of leadership in this department. To do this we must bring integrity to the testing process and eliminate "meritorious" promotions. Meritorious promotions often give us unqualified leaders that are promoted based only on who they know. Removing the mayor's influence over department leadership would lead to better leaders. The department members have no confidence to this pandering mayor.

Appeasing people for political agendas is not grounds for a consent decree. The DOJ report was rushed and put together by an outgoing administration that is not supported by the current administration. Chicago and its politicians need to focus more on why there is so much crime in Chicago. Not handicapping their police officers and making the police feel like the bad guy. This is unsafe for all police and citizens and detrimental in making Chicago a world class city. I advise all involved in this to reconsider.

Equipment upkeep and facility upkeep should be mandated in the form of service contracts or mandated checks. As a organization we allow everything to break and it takes eons for things to get fixed. Vehicles, Buildings, Clean locker rooms, Etc. This may seem "non-essential" however moral would improve. Imagine if at your workplace you showed up everyday to a location that had dirty, bathrooms, Asbestos, cars that were old, comuters that were not updated with current licenses to use Microsoft Word or Excel. Imagine driving thier everyday, would your work performance improve?

Appendix G. CPD Bureau of Patrol Message Regarding Focus Groups

BUREAU OF PATROL

8 April 2018
B.O.P. #18-0083

TO: Deputy Chief All
District Commander All

FROM: Fred L. Waller
Chief
Bureau of Patrol


SUBJECT: Police Foundation Focus Group

The Illinois Attorney General has contracted the Police Foundation (<https://www.policefoundation.org/>), the oldest nationally-known, non-profit, non-partisan, non-membership driven organization, to conduct focus groups with Chicago Police Department members. The purpose of these focus groups is to find out from officers what challenges they face in doing their jobs safely and effectively and what can a consent decree do to help solve these issues.

Participants were randomly selected anonymously by the Police Foundation from patrol districts on all watches. The Police Foundation was never given any identifying information. The selected members will be notified to report to the **Second Floor Training Room at the Public Safety Headquarters at 3510 S. Michigan**. Each session will last no longer than 90 minutes.

Members are required to attend, but participation is voluntary. No identifying information will be collected by the Police Foundation for any reason. The Foundation will only document the groups' responses. This is an opportunity for members to share their opinions regarding the issue they face every day and discuss possible solutions that work for them.

The members on the attached lists have been selected to participate in the Police Foundation Focus Groups. District Commanders will ensure the members are notified to appear as instructed on the date and time listed.


Fred L. Waller
Chief
Bureau of Patrol

FLW/GJD/js
Attachment

Appendix H. Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge #7. Notice “Focus Groups / Consent Decree.” April 11, 2018.



Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge #7 April 11, 2018

Focus Groups / Consent Decree

As you are probably aware, the Illinois Attorney General filed a lawsuit against the City seeking to impose a consent decree upon the Chicago Police Department. The Fraternal of Police opposed the need for this consent decree.

Today, the Lodge became aware of a Bureau of Patrol order entitled Police Foundation Focus Groups. These focus groups are being conducted at Chicago Police Headquarters by a company named the Police Foundation . The order does not specifically state the subject(s) that the focus group will address, but it is believed the group will focus on a proposed consent decree. Attendance is mandatory, but participation is voluntary. Lodge attorneys have recommended that FOP members attend, but refrain from participation in any dialog at this meeting.

More importantly, the Lodge has also become aware of a message from CPD Research and Development that directs FOP members to a website for feedback and suggestions regarding a consent decree proposed by the Illinois Attorney General's Office. The information garnered from Officer responses will be compiled by the National Police Foundation.

Lodge attorneys have advised the Lodge that these are illegal attempts to gain information from our members. Our attorneys strongly suggest that FOP members do not participate in this web-based survey.